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The Genetics of Personality/Psychopathology: A Brief Review of Constructs, 
Results, Approaches and Implications. 
 
Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr. 
Wendy Johnson 




Psychiatric “conditions” are part of the personality sphere and not discrete “disorders”. 
All personality traits are significantly influenced by many genes of very small effect. The 
personality traits that imply dysfunction are positively correlated, implying a general “p” 
factor. The brain is a “kludgy” organ due to the way it evolved. It is likely that 
explanations of psychopathology will also be “kludgy”. Nevertheless, current research 
suggests that we are making sure but slow progress. 
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“We shall never, probably, disentangle the inextricable web of affinities between the 
members of any one class; but when we have a distinct object in view, and we do not 
look to some unknown plan of creation, we may hope to make sure but slow progress” 




This chapter selectively reviews recent work on the genetics, both quantitative and 
molecular, of personality/psychopathology. We use the conjunction 
‘personality/psychopathology’ because one often-useful way to think of “psychiatric 
disorders” is as extremes of continuously measured (not necessarily normally-distributed) 
personality traits (Pettersson et al., 2014). Put simply, we treat psychopathology as part of 
the personality “trait sphere” (Cattell, 1943; Markon, Chmielewski, & Miller, 2011). We 
do not deny that there may be some specific, rare behavioral traits that are discrete classes 
(Norris, Marcus, & Green, 2015), but most currently offered examples do not hold up to 
closer scrutiny (Haslam, Holland, & Kuppens, 2012) and proof of existence of a taxon is 
a very difficult enterprise (Wilmot, 2015).  
 
A Brief Exposition on Psychometric Traits and Quantitative Genetic Methods. 
 
Quantitative measures of personality and psychopathology abound. Some instruments 
make use of brief statements describing a person’s rather general psychological status, 
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI: Tellegen et al., 2003; 
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Trumbetta, Bolinskey, & Gottesman, 2013) being a prime example. Other measures make 
use of specific symptom counts gathered by interview, such as the Diagnostic Interview 
Schedule (Robins, Cottler, Bucholz, & Compton, 1995). Scores and scales can be derived 
in many ways (Simms, 2008) and the number of different scales derived from different 
combinations of items from the single MMPI item pool runs into the hundreds. Scales 
can also be constructed at several levels (facet, trait, higher-order factor) depending on 
the intended use (Condon, 2014). All such scales show evidence of genetic influence. 
This is usually quantified using heritability estimates. Until modern genotyping 
technology became available in the early 2000’s such estimates were based on kinship 
studies for humans and breeding studies for other organisms. The heritability estimates 
for personality and psychiatric traits constitute standards against which estimates of 
genetic influence based on aggregating estimates of effects of individual genetic units 
(alleles) using modern genotyping techniques are compared. Currently the latter estimates 
fall far short of the former, leading to the so-called “puzzle” of “missing heritability” 
(Nolte et al., 2017). In reality, what we have is not missing heritability but a new level of 
analysis and the new questions this always raises. There is now consensus that complex 
traits/diseases such as personality and psychopathology are highly polygenic, influenced 
by many genes of very small effect (Chabris, Lee, Cesarini, Benjamin, & Laibson, 2015), 
with some genes contributing positively and others contributing negatively, sometimes 
even for the same trait in different individuals. In addition, the same genes may well 
contribute differently to different traits, and different genes often fill the same biological 
roles. As Wray and Maier (2014) pointed out: 
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“Consideration of these factors can quickly lead to philosophical musings of the 
definition of disease, since even for a single genetic disease under a polygenic model of 
disease, each individual could carry a unique portfolio of risk loci. In the genomics era, a 
disease definition may be at the pathway level, whereby a single genetic disease 
considers different portfolios of risk loci impacting the same pathway, or, more 
practically, the class of individuals who respond to the same treatment.”  (p. 225). 
 
 
The concept of heritability is often misunderstood. Heritability is not an intrinsic feature 
of a trait or condition. Without going into details, heritability provides an estimate of the 
relative importance of genetic and environmental influences on trait variation in the very 
broadly construed overall environmental conditions experienced by the particular 
population under study. It is a population statistic involving relative proportions of 
variance, with no relevance to mean trait levels in that population, to any particular 
individuals within that population, or to absolute magnitudes of population variance 
(which also can and do vary from sample to sample). Most studies of genetic influence 
have involved populations living in what might be called average expectable 
environments or normal ranges of environments in so-called ‘developed’ nations. 
Consequently findings reported apply to those environments and may not apply to more 
extreme or qualitatively different environments. High heritability does not imply genetic 
determination. Johnson, Penke and Spinath (2011) provide a thoughtful discussion of 
numerous misconceptions regarding heritability.  
 
 6 
Quantitative Genetic Analysis of Measures of Personality/Psychopathology 
 
Recently, Polderman, et al. (2015) carried out a meta-analysis of the heritability of human 
traits (physical and psychological) based on fifty years of twin studies (1958-2012; 
among 3,404 traits, 764 studies of traits labeled ‘Psychiatric’ and 1,774 traits, 280 studies 
of traits labeled ‘Temperament and Personality Functions’). Meta-analysis is intended to 
hone in on ‘the’ size of some quantitative factor, so this study was in some ways misuse 
of the technique. Even individual traits do not have intrinsic heritabilities, and, even if 
they did, there would be no reason to suspect that groupings of different traits should 
have similar or the same heritabilities. Still, the results offer a comprehensive catalog of 
the ranges of heritabilities commonly observed across many different traits.  
 
This catalogue suggests considerable consistency for human traits. Across the 
Personality/Psychiatric category, Polderman, et al. (2015) reported an average heritability 
(h2) of .41 and a common (shared) family environmental influence (c2) of .16 for females 
and values of .41 and .17 for males. Due to the large sample sizes, the standard errors of 
these estimates were tiny. Separate compilations by sex were very similar for all human 
trait categories. But such overall averages, or even within-trait category averages, cannot 
tell us much that really matters. What would be of primary importance in understanding 
their relevance to the underlying transactions between genetic and environmental 
influences on trait development would be the sample-to-sample and study-to-study 
variances in these statistics and any specific genetic factors and/or environmental 
circumstances that contributed systematically to these variances. If these were small, we 
 7 
would infer something quite different about consistency of manifestation of genetic 
similarities than if they were large. The study did not offer any information about this. 
 
The compilations in the Polderman, et al. (2015) paper were also limited in focusing on 
samples of twins reared together. Estimates of genetic and environmental variance 
components from such studies rely on specific assumptions about degrees of genetic and 
environmental relationships between mono- and dizygotic co-twins, independence of 
genetic and environmental influences, and degrees to which twins and their environments 
can be considered typical of those of much more commonly-occurring singleton births. A 
good way to check their validities is to estimate the same quantities in samples from the 
same populations with different degrees of genetic and environmental relationships, 
though doing this is rare. One place where it has been done, however, is Minnesota. 
Table 1 provides a summary of results from two large Minnesota projects making use of 
the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (Tellegen & Waller, 2008).  
 
Table 1 about here 
Besides 1,252 monozygotic twins and 1,263 dizygotic twins reared together (MZT, DZT 
individuals) the Finkel and McGue (1997) study included 495 parents, 333 siblings, 
1,690 spouses and 535 adult offspring of the twins. Estimates of genetic and 
environmental variance components using the MZT and DZT correlations in these data 
were very consistent in aggregate with those from the monozygotic twin correlations in 
the Minnesota Study of Twins Reared Apart (MISTRA) (Segal, 2012). The monozygotic 
twin reared apart (MZA) correlation directly estimates heritability though it relies on 
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somewhat different (though no less specific) assumptions (Bouchard, Lykken, McGue, 
Segal, & Tellegen, 1990). This consistency suggests that the assumptions underlying both 
study designs do not distort the estimates.  
 
In contrast with Polderman et al.’s (2015) summaries for a mixture of psychopathological 
and more ordinary personality characteristics, which reported some common family 
environmental influences, the Minnesota MPQ results with ‘normal-range’ personality 
traits suggested very modest, if any, such influences. This has been typical of normal-
range personality results. Perhaps measures of psychopathology contain more such 
influence than measures of normal-range personality. The heritability of major 
depression, no matter how it is assessed, however, is generally reported to be about .40 
with very little common environmental influence (Flint & Kendler, 2014). A recent large 
twin study replicated the absence of common environmental influences for its full sample 
(heritability of .52), but application of more sophisticated statistical methods suggested  
that heritabilities differed by sex, with males showing common environmental influences 
of .22 and heritability of .35, and females showing values of .01 and .54 (Molenar et al., 
2016). This study demonstrated that quantitative genetic methods continue to evolve, that 
individual estimates can deviate considerably from the Polderman et al. reported 
averages, and that many findings in the field should be considered tentative. 
 
The psychopathology “p” factor.   
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One of the most interesting and perplexing problems in psychiatric diagnosis has been the 
common occurrence of comorbidity (Bebbington, 2015; Moffitt et al., 2010), the apparent 
appropriateness of multiple psychiatric diagnoses for many patients.  Recently the 
categorical approach to psychopathology that generates this comorbidity has yielded to a 
more empirical, quantitative, scale-based factor approach (Lahey, Krueger, Rathouz, 
Waldman, & Zald, 2017) that articulates ‘dimensions’ or ‘axes’ along which dispositional 
vulnerabilities vary subject to underlying genetic and environmental influences. Under 
this newer model comorbidity arises because these psychopathological dimensions or 
axes are themselves inter-related (correlated). Caspi et al. (2013) and Krueger and 
Markon (2014) have argued that, parallel to the g factor in cognitive abilities, there is a 
general p factor in psychopathology. As with the g factor, the existence of a general p 
factor does not negate the importance of more specific, lower-order factors in addressing 
important scientific and applied problems such as variations in efficacies of 
psychopharmacological agents and behaviorally-based treatments among patients 
exhibiting similar clinical features. The suggested p factor does not fully explain either 
overall rates of comorbidity or their tendencies to involve some groupings of disorders 
more than others; residuals specific to individual scales or diagnoses also offer 
explanation. Caspi, et al. studied symptoms gathered from longitudinal interviews while 
Krueger and Markon studied multiple independent replications of cross-sectional 
questionnaire data, but their resulting models were very similar. Their p factors 
contributed directly to two major factors both groups labeled Internalizing (Int) and 
Externalizing (Ext). Both projects also found evidence for a thought-disorder factor, but it 
tended to collapse into the other domains. We ignore this important but unresolved issue 
 10 
here. There is now a wide consensus regarding the validity and utility of the p factor 
(Kim & Eaton, 2017; Kotov et al., 2017). A symptom/network theory consistent with the 
p factor has been put forward by Borsboom (2017, p. 7) and by McNally’s group (Jones, 
Heeren, & McNally, 2017). 
 
Molecular Genetics: Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS) and “Missing 
Heritability” 
 
Given pervasive evidence of genetic influence on personality/psychopathology-related 
traits, their impact on people’s lives, and burgeoning availability of cost-effective 
technology to examine the genomes of large samples of people directly, there is high 
interest in identifying the specific genetic variants that contribute to these traits.  The 
method most commonly used in recent years to do this has been the Genome-Wide 
Association Study (GWAS). A GWAS correlates hundreds of thousands of single-
nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs, sequences of DNA varying relatively frequently in 
human populations) with the traits or diagnostic measures of interest across the genomes 
of population samples often running into the tens and even hundreds of thousands. 
Results from these studies have overwhelmingly fed the emerging consensus that these 
traits are influenced by very large numbers of genes with very small effect sizes and that 
the same genes influence or are involved in many different disorders. This is consistent 
with the notion that the diagnostic psychopathological categories are in reality 
dimensional (Lee, Vattikuti, & Chow, 2016). Typically, the associations (links between 
the SNPs or nearby genes and the traits) suggested in these studies involve genes 
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expressed in the brain, suggesting plausible biological mechanisms (Hibar et al., 2015; 
Lee & McGue, 2016), though effect sizes for individual genes are always so small that 
the possibility that any indicated biological mechanism is necessary to cause the trait or 
condition is very remote.  
 
As noted earlier, there are marked differences between quantitative estimates of 
heritability based on twin studies and GWAS estimates, the so-called “missing 
heritability”. The GWAS methods assume additive effects. Genes underlying GWAS 
markers form “genetic interaction networks” (Shorter et al., 2015, Figure 4, provides a 
nice example), and Mackay (2014) has shown “that additivity can be an emergent 
property of underlying genetic epistatic and interaction networks” (p. 22). Under these 
models, traits manifested by the simulated networks appear to be additive, but the 
underlying processes that were used to generate them involve epistatic and interactive 
aspects. Adding interaction terms to equations based on weighting associations identified 
in GWAS studies could make their estimates of genetic variance more consistent with 
those from quantitative genetic studies. There has been modest success in this area using 
pathway polygenic risk scores (PPRS) that weight the individual genes according not to 
the strengths of their statistical associations with the trait but according to the relative 
importance of the biological pathways they implicate. Genome-wide polygenic scores 
(GPS) are now approaching effect sizes found in some of the social and biological 
sciences (Bouchard, 2007; Selzam et al., 2016) though they involve such large numbers 
of individual genetic markers that most of them did not reach statistical significance in 
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any sample and they tell us little more than do family-based ‘traditional’ quantitative 
genetic studies  
 
Genes and Biological Pathways (Mechanisms) 
 
The long-term goal of understanding how genes influence complex phenotypic 
personality traits will require specifying precisely how particular genes transact with 
environments to influence development of the mechanisms/pathways underlying traits. 
All the traits discussed here are also clearly influenced by environments. Studies of 
model organisms offer many examples of dependence of genetic expression on 
environmental circumstances, so understanding the natures of these gene-environment 
transactions in trait development and expression is criticalii. Two theories of 
psychopathology offer examples of attempts to accomplish this, the “Feinberg 
Hypothesis” involving neural mechanisms and the Vascular Hypothesis involving 
pathophysiology. We chose these two examples not to pit them against each other but to 
emphasize that there are very likely multiple causal mechanisms influencing any existing 
p factor and they are likely biologically heterogeneous. Some causal mechanisms 
probably involve neural networks but co-existing ones may influence systems that 
support very general bodily functions (e.g., blood vessels, hormones, etc.). For example, 
genes influencing Well-Being (sometimes considered reversed Int) are expressed in the 
central nervous system as well as in adrenal and pancreatic tissues (Okbay et al., 2016). 
Genes and environments may also become linked through repeated environmental 
exposures (self-selected or otherwise; passive or active gene-environment correlation). 
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Moreover, just like g, p could be emergent rather than latent, which requires a very 
different theoretical framework within which to understand genetic influences (van der 
Maas et al., 2006). 
 
The Feinberg Hypothesis suggests that schizophrenia is in part caused by a fault in the 
synaptic pruning normally occurring during adolescence. This is the critical period during 
which symptoms often first appear (Feinberg, 1982-1983). Progressive cortical thinning, 
as psychosis develops, has been observed (Cannon et al., 2015), and genes involved in 
this thinning have now been associated with schizophrenia (Sekar et al., 2016) as well as 
bipolar disorder (Hanford, Nazarov, Hall, & Sassi, 2016). There is also evidence that de 
novo, newly-appearing, mutations influence genetic risk for schizophrenia by influencing 
synaptic networks (Fromer, 2014).  
 
The Vascular Hypothesis posits that abnormalities in genetic polymorphisms that regulate 
inflammatory responses interfere with “exquisitely precise regulation of the delivery of 
energy and oxygen required for normal brain function” (Hanson & Gottesman, 2005). A 
corollary of this hypothesis is that environmental agents trigger inflammatory responses. 
Inflammatory influences on the brain, measured via retinal imaging, have now been 
related to both the p factor and IQ (Meier et al., 2013; Shalev et al., 2013). Genes 
regulating inflammatory response (among others) have also been related to risk of 
schizophrenia (Andreassen, Harbo, & Wang, 2015).  
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Potential involvement in specific personality/psychopathology traits of the 
pathophysiological mechanisms underlying these hypotheses can be investigated in 
considerable detail (Ruzzo & Geschwind, 2016). Even if these mechanisms influenced 
behavior in only individual patients and only to small degrees, they would be causal 
mechanisms in the fundamental sense of the word. There may well be many co-existing 
mechanisms of this sort, each influenced by numerous genes, and the particular ones 
involved may differ among traits. Methods facilitating discovery and roles played by 
genes underlying complex traits are rapidly proliferating (Gamazon et al., 2015; Potkin, 
van Erp, Ling, Macciardi, & Xie, 2016; Wang et al., 2016).  
 
The Feinberg and Vascular hypotheses were proposed before GWAS came into regular 
use. GWAS have merely offered evidence potentially consistent with them. Moreover, 
the manner in which they have done so suggests rather strongly that it is not any 
particular genes that matter in generating psychopathologies, but genes’ aggregate 
involvement in emergent processes that somehow send biological pathways ‘off-course’, 
with the ‘somehow’ remaining a wide-open space in which environmental input is 
important. In addition, though we know many so called “risk genes” are expressed in the 
human brain, we do not know the neuronal subtypes influenced by those genes (Lake et 
al., 2016).  
 
Closing Thoughts from an Evolutionary Perspective: Complexity as a Consequence 
of “Descent with Modification”. 
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Four large facts stand out from the body of research we have briefly reviewed. First, all 
complex traits are heritable. Second is pervasive co-morbidity, both at the phenotypic and 
molecular levels. Third, these traits are influenced by a very large number of genes of 
very small effect. Finally, there is pleiotropy/epistasis, individual genes having multiple 
influences and interacting with other genes, in simultaneous transaction with the 
environment. How do these facts intermesh with evolutionary processes? Nature is a 
tinkerer and the brain is not an elegantly designed and optimized adaptive machine. The 
brain is made up of multiple layers of more recently evolved systems overlaid on older 
systems (Allman, 2000, Chap. 3; Panksepp, 2011). This creates problems of coordination 
among systems, but also a level of redundancy that can maintain phenotypic function 
despite disruption of individual operative pathways. Jacob (1977) likened the human 
brain to a jet engine (cortex) mounted on an old horse cart (subcortical regions) and 
noted, “It is not surprising, …. that accidents, difficulties, and conflicts, can occur” (p. 
1166). Consequently, complex biological organisms and their brains lie somewhere 
between “design” and “bricolage” (Wilkins, 2007). That ‘somewhere’ is a “kluge”, a 
less-than-elegant mechanism, but “good enough” (Marcus, 2008), at least for some period 
of time in some environments. Systems biology and analysis of modular networks 
(Sporns & Betzel, 2016) are being used to explicate brain networks. The connectome 
project’s goal, for example, is to identify and map the networks that underlie brain 
disorders (Fornito, Zalesky, & Breakspear, 2015). It has recently indicated that the human 
cerebral cortex is structurally more complex than previously believed, articulating 97 new 
areas as well as the previously known 83 (Glasser et al., 2016). These networks are also 
likely kludgy. Weiss and Buchanan (2011) summarized the situation as follows; 
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 “Much of life seems to be characterized by ad hoc, ephemeral, contextual probabilism 
without proper underlying distributions. To the extent that this is true, causal effects are 
not asymptotically predictable, and new ways of understanding life may be required.” (p. 
761).  
 
Turkheimer (2016) came to a similar “gloomy” conclusion for behavioral traits.  
 
“What we will see instead is a proliferation of small, diverse, contingent findings that do 
not accumulate into coherent scientific theories. These will not be robust findings with 
large effect sizes; they will be the signature of a complex problem being addressed at the 
wrong level of analysis. They will be the keyless sidewalk under the genomic streetlight.” 
(p. 28). 
 
We do not disagree that the problem is complex and we may need “new ways of 
understanding life”. We, however, side with Darwin and “hope to make sure but slow 
progress”. There is no reason to doubt that how genes influence the multi-various 
pathways (networks/structures, etc.) that underlie “traits” can be worked outiii. The 
various solutions will be messy (kludgy). One consequence of this messiness is that a 
given value on any particular trait (e.g., IQ) is likely to be achievable via different genetic 
and environmental pathways (equifinality) due to unique portfolios of loci living in 
unique environments. In an important sense any individual gene per se may or may not be 
involved, its role depending on a variety of other things (contextual probability). From 
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this point of view, the status of every individual on every trait is to some extent emergent.  
 
Legends 
Table 1: Heritability estimates from a multiple group design by gender and intraclass 
correlations for monozygotic and dizygotic twins reared apart (MZA, DZA) and reared 
together (MZT, DZT). 
Note: The DZA and DZT samples include both same sex and opposite sex twins. The 
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i Prof. Gottesman passed away on June 29th, 2016 before the completion of this 
manuscript. 
ii The focus of this chapter has precluded discussion of the complexities introduced by 
both environmental influences and development. These topics have been dealt with 
elsewhere (Bouchard, 2016; Johnson, 2014).  
iii Most of these pathways will be initially worked out using lower animals where 
powerful experimental manipulations can be implemented and causal mechanisms 
explicated (Kukekova, Temnykh, Johnson, Trut, & Acland, 2012; Shorter et al., 2015).  
                                                 
